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ABSTRACT

As technology advances and society becomes more

dependent on information technology (IT), the exposure to
vulnerabilities and threats increase. In the year 2000 the

"I love you" virus, was able to cause over $2 billion in
damages worldwide. Many cyber threats have been reported

and documented throughout the advancement of IT, resulting
in not only monetary damages but invasion of privacy and

risks to national security. Realizing the need for
enhanced cyber security and information security

management criteria, federal regulations have mandated the

capability, provision, and notification of cyber security
incidents. In this new direction, incident response plays

an essential role in cyber security. It is one of the last

lines of defense and is vital in the event of a

cyber-catastrophe. However measuring the performance and

creating accountability for computer security incident
response (CSIR) capabilities still remains an issue. Many

government organizations still struggle to determine what
security metrics to use and how to find value within them.

In this effort a metrics framework has been developed
for incident response to serve as an internal analysis,

supporting continuous improvement in incident reporting
and strengthening the security posture for an

organization's mission. There are five elements that are

critical to the metrics framework for CSIR:
1) understanding the three types of measures,

2) establishing objective driven metrics, 3) produce

results based on audience considerations, 4) tie incident
response (IR) evaluations to improve IR capabilities that

support the organization's mission, and 5) process flow
identification for CSIR. The goal of this metrics
framework for (CSIR) aims to provide a holistic approach

towards security metrics which is specific to incident
reporting and promotes efforts of more practical and clear

guidelines on measuring the computer security incident
response team (CSIRT). An additional benefit to this

project is that it provides middle management with a
framework for measuring the results of incident reporting

in a CSIR program.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to thank the following people for helping me

in my journey to discover what computer security incident
response is and for aiding me in developing this metrics

framework for computer security incident response:
■

Committee Members for This Project: Dr. C.E.

Tapie Rohm Jr., Dr. Walter Stewart, and Dr. Jake
Zhu.

Laura

Javier

Carrizales, Information Security Office at
California State University San Bernardino
Department of Treasury, Office of the Chief
Information Officer in Cyber Security: CISO

Edward Roback, ACISO Don Cohen, Senior Analyst
(System One Contractor) Barbara Gorsen

Gartner Analysts Michael Smith and Jeffrey

Wheatman
Scholarship for Service Program
Information Assurance & Security Management

Program at CSUSB
California State University San Bernardino, MBA

Research Grant and Business Alliance for their
financial support

v

DEDICATION

I wish to dedicate this MBA project to my family,
friends, and CSUSB's MBA Information Assurance & Security

Management program. Thank you all for the guidance,
support, and encouragement to strive for more. My

achievements are only as great as the people I am able to
share them with. So thank you all and I will continue to
excel and make you all proud.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT............................................. iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................................

v

LIST OF TABLES.......................................

ix

LIST OF FIGURES......................................

x

CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND

Introduction ....................................

1

Purpose of the Project..........................

2

Problem Background ..............................

3

Context of the Problem..........................

5

Scope of the Project............................

7

Significance of the Project .....................

8

Assumptions........................

8

Limitations .....................................

9

Definition of Terms.............................

10

Organization of the Project.....................

11

CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction ....................................

13

Measurement Types for Computer Security
Incident Response ...............................

14

Three Types of Measurements: Cost, Time, and
Quality.........................................

15

Security Metrics..................

17

Objective Driven Measurements ...................

18

Process Flow Identification .....................

18

Audience Based Metrics ..........................

20

vi

Tying Security Metrics to Organization's
Mission.......................... '..............

20

Summary.........................................

21

CHAPTER THREE: FORMATION OF THE PROJECT
Introduction ....................................

22

Coursework.................................

22

Internship.................................

23

Literature Research ........................

24

Summary.........................................

25

CHAPTER FOUR: METRICS FRAMEWORK FOR COMPUTER
SECURITY INCIDENT RESPONSE

Introduction ....................................

26

Steps to Use the Metrics Framework..............

27

Three Types of Measures for Computer Security
Incident Response ...............................

28

Objective Driven Measurements ...................

34

Audience Based Measurements .....................

36

Tying Measurements to the Agency's Mission......

39

Process Flow Identification.....................

40

Measurement Form for Computer Security
Incident Response ...............................

43

Summary.........................................

48

CHAPTER FIVE: APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK
Introduction . ....................................

50

Case Scenario...................................

50

Sample Data.....................................

53

Metric Development ..............................

55

vii

Step by Step Application

55

Scope of Analysis...............................

62

Results.........................................

63

Root Cause......................................

67

BeMade By Management...............

68

Summary.........................................

70

Decision to

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction ....................................

71

Conclusions..........................

71

Recommendations .................................

72

Summary . ... ;....................................

72

APPENDIX A: UNITED STATES COMPUTER EMERGENCY
READINESS TEAM REPORTING CRITERIA........

73

APPENDIX B: FORMULAS FOR COMPUTER SECURITY
INCIDENT RESPONSE BY CENTER FOR
INTERNET SECURITY...............

75

APPENDIX C:

ACRONYMS ................................

77

REFERENCES...........................................

79

viii

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Sample Incident Reports .....................

54

Table 2. Duration for Sample Incident Reports ........

65

ix

LIST OF FIGURES

Metrics Framework for Incident
Response..................................

27

Three Measurement Types for Incident
Response..................................

28

Figure 3.

Cost Types for Incident Response ..........

29

Figure 4.

Time Measurement Points for Incident
Response..................................

32

Figure 5.

Audience Based Measurements ...............

36

Figure 6.

Bureau Level Process Flow .................

41

Figure 7.

Agency Level Process Flow.................

42

Figure 8.

Incident Response Measurement Form
Part 1....................................

44

Incident Response Measurement Form
Part 2....................................

47

Figure 10. The Metrics Framework for Incident
Response..................................

48

Figure 11. Columns and Names for Sample Incident
Reports...................................

52

Figure 1.

Figure 2.

Figure 9.

Figure 12.

Measurement Form for Metric ID 001......

57

Figure 13.

Measurement Form for Metric ID 002 ........

59

Figure 14.

Measurement Form for Metric ID 003 ........

61

Figure 15.

Incident Count by Category ................

63

Figure 16.

Incident Count by Category and Bureau .....

64

Figure 17. Percentage of Incidents Reporting On
Time......................................

66

Figure 18. List of Root Causes by Computer
Emergency Response Team Coordination
Center....................................

67

Figure 19. Measurement Form for Metric ID 004 ........

69

x

CHAPTER ONE
BACKGROUND

Introduction
As technology becomes more prevalent and reliance on

IT expands, the exposure to vulnerabilities and threats
increase. Malware, social engineering, and zero day

attacks have evolved to outpace current IT security
controls. In the 2009 Cyberspace Policy Review by the

White House, the United States (US) acknowledged its need
for more reliable, resilient, and trustworthy digital
infrastructure for the future (White House, 2009).

Realizing the need for enhanced cyber security and

information security management criteria, federal
regulations have mandated the capability, provision, and
notification for cyber security incidents (H.R. 2458—56).
The United States-Computer Emergency Readiness Team

(US-CERT) requires incidents by category type for computer

security incident response to be reported within specific
timeframes. The requirement creates an audit trail for the
purpose of awareness and collaboration. However, the main
concern drawn from this initiative is accountability. How
can an organization follow alerts, check validations, and

track remediation efforts? What controls are in place to
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determine if appropriate reporting methods exist and are
being used properly? How can an organization verify that

requirements are being met? Additionally, in the event
that reporting methods are confirmed, how can

organizations measure performance? By examining the
federal work space, it is apparent that federal agencies

are required to adhere to the Federal Information Security

Management Act (FISMA) of 2002 (H.R. 2458—56), Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) directives (0MB Circular No.
A-130, Appendix III), and the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) US-CERT timeframe reporting requirements
(US-CERT, 2011). In this effort the metrics framework for

incident response has been developed to serve as an
internal analysis, supporting continuous improvement in
incident reporting and strengthening the security posture
for an organization's mission.

Purpose of the Project
The purpose of this metrics framework for CSIR aims

to provide a holistic approach towards security metrics

which is specific to incident reporting and promotes

efforts of more practical and clear guidelines on
measuring the CSIRT. In addition, the purpose of this
project is to provide middle management with a framework
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for measuring the results of incident reporting in a CSIR
program.

Problem Background

From the birth of the Computer Emergency Response

Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC) in 1988 (Computer
Emergency Readiness Team, 2011A) to the establishment of
the US-CERT1 in 2003 (US-CERT, 2008), the US has

acknowledged the need for real cyber security and CSIR

reporting. In 1988 the Morris Worm, a self-replicating

program, brought over 6000 computers worldwide to its
knees (Garfinkel, 2005) . In 1999 the Melissa Virus used

Microsoft's Word and Excel exploits to propagate itself
across the net via email (Mills, 2009) . In 2000 the "I
love you" bug, very similar to the Melissa Virus, added
the ability to destroy data causing over $2 billion in

damages worldwide (PC Tools, 2010). Today, countries such
as Estonia and Georgia are examples of when nation states

have been incapacitated by the real dangers of
cyber-attacks (Davis, 2007; & Markoff, 2008). Cyber

threats now persist in the expansion of attack
sophistication and in intruder knowledge (Software

Engineering Institute, 2010). Since these events, efforts

1 US-CERT is the operating arm of the National Cyber Security
Division (NCSD) at DHS
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for Public Private Partnership (PPP) and. the construction

of the US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) have demonstrated the
new direction that the US government and US military are

partaking (Armed Forces Communications & Electronics

Associate, 2010). In this new direction, incident

reporting plays the role of networking and collaboration.
It is- one of the last lines of defense and is vital in the

event of a cyber-catastrophe.
The challenge to accurately determine if requirements

are met is a tremendous difficulty to overcome. The

Inspector General (IG) of an Agency and DHS, in pursuit of

FISMA audits, has the role and responsibility to check if
requirements are satisfied. Audits now move from yes and

no questions to asking for greater detail to ensure

compliance. As part of the "National Cybersecurity
Strategy' the DHS has been designated the focal point for
critical infrastructure protection, where incident
reporting is a main component of ensuring our national

cyber security (National Security Council, 2 011) .

Unfortunately, the past has demonstrated the lack of cyber
security preparedness when it comes to federal agencies.
The last review (2009) by the General Accountability

Office (GAO) on federal wide information security controls
stated that almost all 24 major federal agencies had
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weaknesses in their information security controls (General
Accountability Office, 2009). The US government as a whole
is now trying to move towards greater cyber security

controls, but ensuring collaboration and accountability is
another i s sue.

Context of the Problem
Although security metrics have gained large focus
from government and industry, many organizations still

struggle to determine what metrics to use and how to find
value from them (Center for Internet Security Community,
2009; Gorsan, Personal Communication, 2010; & Torner,

Personal Communication, 2011). The fundamental concern
with security metrics comes from knowing how to capture
the cause and effect. With greater requirements for

security controls being mandated for accountability (Joint

Task Force Transformation Initiative, 2009), many groups
are creating their own security metrics without

understanding the full scope or how it connects to the

organization's objectives. For example, in the evaluation
of incident reporting, incident types are categorized by
the US-CERT. Timeframe requirements for reporting are

given with the purpose of providing a methodology for

awareness and coordination amongst key providers of our
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technological infrastructure. In the federal work space
the OMB Circular No. A-130 Appendix III directs federal

agencies to "ensure that there is a capability to provide
help to users when a security incident occurs in the

system and to share information concerning common

vulnerabilities and threats" (OMB Circular No. A-130,

Appendix III, Para. A,3,a,2,d). In addition, places like
NIST (NIST, 2011), CIS (Center for Internet Security
Community, 2010), and CERT/CC (Computer Emergency
Readiness Team, 2011B) all provide guidance and various

metrics on measuring incident response handling. The

amount of security metrics coming from government and
other communities make it very difficult to interpret and

properly comprehend how to properly measure CSIR
capabilities. The lack of a governing body or

collaboration between security metrics within the federal

space also makes it almost impossible to come to a
conclusion. Furthermore, determining which security metric
is appropriate and which to use over another can be

frustrating. Without a consensus and with requirements and
directives mandating greater security controls and greater

accountability, organizations are up in arms when creating
their own metrics for their own auditing purposes. Along
with the chaos of trying to constantly anticipate audits
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and reviews for specific requirements, there is a need for

a structured metrics framework to help organizations

achieve their objectives.

In order to measure the effectiveness and efficiency

of incident management we must have at least a basis of
understanding of the metrics that measure the

effectiveness and efficiency of our organization's major
processes. Incident management is a means to an end for an
organization. However, it is not the end state of the
organization. It is an end state objective. Therefore,

when dealing with efficiency and effectiveness of incident

management, the security metric must relate back to the

overall organizational objective. This metrics framework
attempts to address the confusion behind security metrics

to provide a holistic view that aids organizations to
better utilize security metrics, improve processes for
incident reporting, and strengthen the organization's

overall security posture.
Scope of the Project

The scope of this project is to develop a metrics

framework for use in measuring CSIRT performance. This
project specifically targets program manager's measuring

CSIR program performance. The requirements for timeframe
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reporting by US-CERT are applied throughout this metrics

framework for CSIR and are used in Chapter Five
Application of the Metrics Framework.
Significance of the Project
The significance of this project is to assist in real

world problems such as, passing FISMA audits, achieving
plan of actions and milestones (POA&Ms), and informing

management of the value from having CSIR capabilities.

Using the developed metrics framework and accompanying
metric form, performance measurement for CSIR can be

better structured to inform upper management on current

CSIR capabilities, areas of CSIR that are doing well, and
areas of CSIR that need improvement. With this developed
metrics framework, managers can understand what they are

measuring, why they are measuring, and how they can go
about measuring. This will enable management to make

better, more informed decisions in regards to continuous
improvement for CSIR and tie security metrics to support
the agency's mission.

Assumptions

The following assumptions were made regarding this

project:
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1.

The agency is bound by the Federal Information
Security Management Act of 2002 (H.R. 2458—56),
Office of Management and Budget directives (OMB

Circular No. A-130, Appendix III), and US-CERT
Government reporting requirements (US-CERT,

2011)

2.

The agency has computer security incident

response capabilities
3.

The agency is capturing CSIR data and has a
collection of incident reports

4.

The agency is using this metrics framework for

CSIR to measure CSIR performance and
capabilities

Limitations
During the development of this project, a number of

limitations were noted. These limitations are as shown:

1.

Some formulas apply specifically to Federal
Government reporting requirements

2.

The metrics framework is specific to measuring

performance for computer security incident
response capabilities

3.

Accurately measuring cost will depend on the

amount of information known for assigned costs
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and the amount of time and effort an

organization wishes to consume in order to
achieve greater accuracy.

Definition of Terms
The following terms are defined as they apply to this
proj ect.
Computer Security Incident Response Team: "an organization

or team that provides services and support to a
defined constituency for preventing, handling, and
responding to computer security incidents"

(Alberts,

Dorofee, Killcrece, Ruefle, & Zajicek, 2004, p. 1).
Framework: "an essential supporting or underlying
structure"

(Soanes & Stevenson, 2008, para. 13)

Incident: "any event that takes place through, on, or
constituting information technology resources that

requires a staff member or administrator to
investigate and/or take action to reestablish,

maintain, or protect the resources, services, or data

of the community or individual members of the

community" (Rezmierski, Deering, Fazio, & Ziobro,

1998, p. 14) .
Measurement: "single-point-in-time views of specific,
discrete, factors"

(Payne, 2006, p. 1).
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Metric: "generated from analysis; derived by comparing to
a predetermined baseline two or more measurements
taken over time" (Payne, 2006, p. 1).

Triage: "The process of receiving, initial sorting, and
prioritizing of information to facilitate its

appropriate handling"

(West-Brown, Stikvoort,

Kossakowski, Killcrece, Ruefle, & Zajicek, 2003,

p. 191).

Personally Identifiable Information (PII): "any

information about an individual that is maintained by
an agency, including information that can be used to
distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such

as name, Social Security number, date and place of
birth, mother's maiden name, biometric records, and
any other personally information that is linked or
linkable to an individual"

(General Accountability

Office, 2008, p. 5).

Organization of the Project
This project is divided into six chapters. Chapter
One provides the introduction, purpose, problem

background, context of the problem, scope of the project,

significance of the project, project limitations, and
definition of terms. Chapter Two comprises of a literature
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review on relevant works pertaining to the metrics
framework for CSIR. Chapter Three documents the steps

involved in developing the project including funding,

coursework, work experience, and literature research.
Chapter Four presents the metrics framework for CSIR and
the measurement form for middle management to measure CSIR

performance. Chapter Five provides an illustration for use
of the metrics framework and measurement form. Chapter Six
presents the conclusion and recommendations drawn from the

development of this project. The appendices and references
follow Chapter Six. The Appendices for the project

consists of: Appendix A US-Cert Reporting Criteria;
Appendix B Formulas For Computer Security Incident
Response; Appendix C Acronyms.
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CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduct ion

Since the early 1990s, from the Defense Advanced
Research Project Agency's (DARPAs) push for CERT/CC to the

establishment of US-CERT by DHS, the federal government
has initiated multiple efforts for cyber security and CSIR

(Ellis, Fisher, Longstaff, Pesante, & Pethia, 1997; White
House, 2009; & Wilshusen, 2011). The efforts for
accountability have been established under FISMA (H.R.

2458—56), OMB directives (0MB Circular No. A-130, Appendix
III), and IG audits (Department of Homeland Security,

2010). However, the effectiveness for measuring
performance and compliance still remains a controversy

(General Accountability Office, 2010; Hopkins, 2009).

Audits have continually evolved from yes and no questions
to how many and why (Gorsen, Personal Communication,

2010). Efforts to effectively account for programs such as
CSIR have become an area of concern.
This review of the literature on security metrics for

CSIR focuses on the following questions:
1)

How can computer security incident Response be

measured?
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2)

What types of security measurements exist for
!
i
computer security incident response?
;

I
Measurement Types for Computer
Security Incident Response

;
I
i
There is a wide variety of reputable publications

i

illustrating measurement types and metrics for CSIR. In
the NIST Special Publication 800-55 Revision 1, Chew, |
I

Swanson, Stine, Bartol, Brown, and Robinson (2008) define
i

measurement types for information security as

;

implementation, effectiveness/efficiency, and impact. The

authors establish that these are measurement types but
i
they are actually purposes, the drive for measuring
1
I
information security. In another NIST publication, NIST

i
i

Special Publication 800-61 Revision 1, Scarfone, Grance,
and Masone (2008) suggest possible metrics for CSIR as the
.1
number of incidents handled, time per incident, objectlive
!
assessment of each incident, and subjective assessment! of

each incident. These metrics are very practical but

[
i
suggest only a small portion of possible metrics and I

measurement types for measuring CSIR. In another technical

report from Carnegie Mellon's Software Engineering
Institute (SEI), Dorofee, Killcrece, Ruefle, Zajicek

(2007), measures incident management based on common
functions and processes within CSIR work flow. Their
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approach to measure CSIR capabilities, also stated as

incident management capabilities, is based on evaluating
business functions. This form of measuring CSIR looks

primarily at overall performance, while attempting to
apply its own scoring rubric to business functions within

CSIR. An additional measurement type or scale is defined

by Allen & Davis (2010) as nominal, ordinal, interval, and

ratio. These are specific measurement types based on
possible mathematic operations and measurable service
types for CSIR. Lastly, another insight into the types of

measurements for CSIR is suggested by Gartner Analyst and
metrics expert Jeffrey Wheatman (2010) as cost, time, and

quality for any metric. Wheatman's statement of cost,

time, and quality for metrics is based on common sense and

practical knowledge. Compared to the various types of
measurement or metrics suggested from other authors,

Wheatman's approach to measurement types of security
metrics in CSIR is holistic because it provides the
flexibility to measure for any purpose or objective.
Three Types of Measurements:
Cost, Time, and Quality

Measurements of cost, time, and quality are evident

in business as the 'iron triangle', but the terms are used
in a different context for this metrics framework for
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CSIR. Atkinson (1999) reviews the measurements of cost,
time, and quality as it pertains to project management.
The tradeoffs that exist within a project are similar to a

cost benefit analysis that is useful to project
management. However, for this metrics framework for CSIR,
Wheatman's (2010) basic concept of cost, time, and quality

is used for the three measurement types. Allen and Davis
(2010), in a technical report agree with the definition of
cost as a value of money. The evaluation of cost is taken

in a literal sense as encompassing only financial value,

meaning dollars and cents. Scarfone, Grance, and Masone
(2008) refer to time as the time an incident occurs to the

time it is resolved. The importance of time as a
measurement is referenced to timeframe or duration of an

incident. As for quality, West-Brown, Stikvoort,
Kossakowski, Killcrece, Ruefle, Zajicek (2003) identify

quality as quality parameters that are common between

services or functions. Quality is defined as good or bad
based on how well the expectation level and set parameters
are met. The three types of measurements for CSIR exist

throughout aspects of publications regarding CSIR.
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Security Metrics
There are numerous publications for security metrics,
but there is not one governing source that combines the
efforts of creating security metrics. Chew, Swanson,

Stine, Bartol, Brown, and Robinson (2008) provide a guide
for creating measurement for information security

programs. They provide a comprehensive guide that is very
useful for measuring information security. Additionally,
the Center for Internet Security Community (2010) has

derived 28 metric definitions that apply broadly to 7
information security programs such as, incident
management, vulnerability management, patch management,

application security, configuration management, and

financial metrics. They emphasize providing common metrics
and definitions that support measurement of important
business functions. In addition, Jansen (2009) indicates

the direction of security metrics research going towards

formal models and security measurement and metrics,

historical data collection and analysis, artificial
intelligence assessment techniques, practical concrete
measurement methods, and intrinsically measurable

components. Security metrics is on the path stated by
Jansen and evidence of more practical and formal models
are demonstrated by the effort of this project.
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\

Objective Driven Measurements

The purpose of a measurement is to serve a particular
objective. Chew, Swanson, Stine, Bartol, Brown, and
Robinson (2008) state that organizations should define the

scope of their .information security measurement program

based off strategic goals and objectives among other

things. In an interview with Barbara Gorsen (2010), Gorsen

states that objectives need to be clearly defined before
pursuing measurements within CSIR. Allen and Davis (2010)
identify the importance of establishing objectives as a
basis for measurements. Measurements, therefore, are

derived from objectives to validate the reason for

assessment. Lastly, in the Security Measurement and
Analysis Project by Carnegie Mellon's SEI, Alberts, Allen,
and Stoddard (2011) discuss mission-objective-driver

protocols that drive analysis. This metrics framework
clearly identifies objectives as an essential criterion to
the development of measurements and to drive the basis for

evaluation.
Process Flow Identification

Identifying incident response capabilities process

flow provides a map of how an incident is handled from

start to finish. In a technical report from Carnegie
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Mellon's SEI, Alberts, Dorofee, Killcrece, Ruefle, and

Zajicek (2004) define incident management processes for

CSIRTs using a process model. The process model for
incident management outlines and documents process
activities to aid in benchmarking. The common processes
for evaluation are stated as: "Prepare/Sustain/Improve

(Prepare), Protect Infrastructure (Protect), Detect Events

(Detect), Triage Events (Triage), and Respond" (Alberts,

Dorofee, Killcrece, Ruefle, & Zajicek, 2004, p. 8).

Additionally, recommendations for creating a CSIRT by
Scarfone, Grance, and Masone (2009) address the need for

developing incident response procedures that cover all the
phases of the incident response process. There is a direct

correlation between understanding and documenting

processes and benefiting from it when measuring CSIR
capabilities. Chew, Swanson, Stine, Bartol, Brown, and

Robinson (2008) state that developing performance measures
in advance during the creation of a security program
allows for the benefit and ease of security metrics.

Understanding the processes for improvement is again
stated by Dorofee, Killcrece, Ruefle, and Zajicek (2007)

as essential for metrics evaluating incident management
capabilities. Identifying and being aware of processes
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enables for more accurate measurements and offers process
improvement opportunities.
Audience Based Metrics

The notion of audience based measurements derives

from professional experience, personal communication, and
from the idea that different perspectives exist. Gartner
analyst Michael Smith (2010) discussed the importance of

understanding the audience and their expectations, and
their needs associated with their position as a

stakeholder within CSIR. Additionally, Niven (2008)
addresses the four perspectives that exist for a balanced
scorecard. This includes the customer perspective,

internal process perspective, financial perspective, and
employee learning and growth perspective. The concept of

different views as a basis for metric requirements was
essential in the development of audience based metrics.
Tying Security Metrics to Organization's Mission

Chew, Swanson, Stine, Bartol, Brown, and Robinson

(2008) state that federal agencies need to link
information security with enterprise strategic planning.
West-Brown, Stikvoort, Kossakowski, Killcrece, Ruefle, and
Zajicek (2003) also state that CSIRTs mission must

complement the organization's mission. The point of
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information security efforts is to support the agency's
overall goals and objectives. Additionally, in an
interview with Gartner Analyst Michael Smith (2010), Smith

noted that the point of CSIR is to assist in the agency's

mission. Therefore, measuring CSIR should follow suit by
looking at ways to improve CSIR capabilities to support
the agency's mission. Tying security metrics to the

organization's mission is vital to the success of security
metrics for CSIR.

Summary
The literature important to the project was presented

in Chapter Two. The analysis of the above literature was
essential in establishing a foundation of past and current

literature relevant to CSIR. In addition, the literatures

most relevant to the components of the metrics framework
for CSIR were reviewed. From these literatures the metrics
framework moves forward in an effort to support

collaboration and practical security metrics for CSIR.
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CHAPTER THREE
FORMATION OF THE PROJECT

Introduc t ion

In order to bring value to this metrics framework for
CSIR, it was important to incorporate higher level
education, work experience, and literature research

regarding current initiatives and best practices for CSIR.
The formation of this project involved gaining the
knowledge and experience necessary to fully comprehend

what is needed for security metrics in CSIR. In order to

make this possible I pursued an intensive course at
Carnegie Mellon, a 10 week internship under the program of

incident management, and conducted an in-depth research

and analysis for existing documentation relevant to CSIR
best practices.
The knowledge gained from this project was attained

through the following activities:
Coursework
Coursework: Software Engineering Institute by

Carnegie Mellon - Fundamentals of Incident Response
Handling (5 days intensive course - Arlington, Virginia)

Description: "The course is designed to provide

insight into the work that an incident handler may
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perform. It provided an overview of the incident handling

arena, including CSIRT services, intruder threats, and the
nature of incident response activities"

(Software

Engineering Institute, 2011, para. 2).

Internship

Information Security Office, CSUSB: Practical
experience with vulnerability assessments using Nessus and
the intrusion detection system using Snort. Internship

offered hands on experience dealing with incidents from
internal controls within a university setting (2 years

part-time - San Bernardino, California).

Incident Management, Cyber Security Division,
Department of Treasury: Discussion with System One

(Contractor) Senior Analyst, Barbara Gorsen, and Gartner

Analyst, Michael Smith, on metrics framework for CSIR.
Additionally, I conducted an internal analysis on incident
reporting.2 I also assisted with preparations for FISMA
and inspector general (IG) audits under the sections

related to incident management (10 weeks Full-time Washington, District of Columbia).

2 Sensitive But Unclassified: details unavailable for disclosure.
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The education and internship experiences were

necessary to give me a solid foundation into CSIR and how

analysis on CSIR capabilities really worked. From that

point I analyzed the existing literature to extract the
best practices and create a clear, more practical

framework for measuring CSIR.
Literature Research
The literature research conducted for this project

involved analysis of originating documentation for CSIR to

current best practices used in the field. Thanks to the
coursework and internships, I received direction from
professionals in the field, enabling me to start my
literature research on target.
The original documentation for CSIR starts with

Carnegie Mellon's Computer Emergency Response
Team/Coordination Center's (CERT CC) Handbook for Computer

Security Incident Response Teams. The best practices and
governing literature on CSIR exists in NIST Special
Publication 800-55 and 800-61, Carnegie Mellon's Software

Engineering Institute publications and the Center for

Internet Security's Security Metrics V.1.1.0. The
literature research tries to encompass past and present

documentation relevant to the field of CSIR.

24

Summary
For the benefit of this project's metrics framework
for CSIR, the full scope of education, work experience,

and literature research was undertaken. The formation of
the project was to understand the essential literatures

and real work experiences that are needed to measure CSIR

capabilities. In order to make a practical yet effective
metrics framework for CSIR, acquiring the knowledge,
skills, and experience were the foundation for the
formation of this project.

25

CHAPTER FOUR

METRICS FRAMEWORK FOR COMPUTER
SECURITY INCIDENT RESPONSE

Introduction
Metrics framework for CSIR, for the context of this

project, is a basis for measuring the performance of a

CSIR program. The framework comes from the construct of
the different measurement types and the essential elements

needed to determine, select, and execute a particular

measurement within CSIR. The five elements that are
critical to the metrics framework for CSIR include:
1) understanding the three types of measures,

2) establishing objective driven metrics, 3) produce

measurements and results based on audience considerations,

4) tie incident response (IR) evaluations to improve IR
capabilities that support the organization's mission, and

5) process flow identification for CSIR. The purpose of
the metrics framework is to provide a practical guide that

enables CSIR stakeholders to measure IR performance and
improve IR capabilities. The following sections will go
into detail on the major aspects of the metrics framework
for CSIR and provide a holistic yet practical approach for
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evaluating IR.

(See Figure 1. Metrics Framework for

Computer Security Incident Response, Below)

Metrics Framework for Incident Response

Cost

Quality

Time

Admir istrative Le\ el View
Ope r ationa! Levd! View

External Level Hew
. ... .......

Continuous Improvement in Incident Response <

/!IX
> Organization’s Mission
Tie

Figure 1. Metrics Framework for Incident Response

Steps to Use the Metrics Framework

Before using the metrics framework one needs to have

an understanding of one's agency's CSIR capabilities, its

maturity level, and what types of measurements exist for
evaluating CSIR. The first step is to determine what is
the objective and purpose for measuring CSIR capabilities.

The second step is to select what measurement to use based
off the determination of the objective and purpose. The

third step requires the identification of all data sources
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and responsible parties. Then the measurement is conducted

with the appropriate approval from management. The fourth
step is to tailor the results specific to the needs of the

audience base, giving consideration to viewing

requirements. The fifth step is to assess the results and

determine if action is needed. The sixth step is to take

action, if needed, and review all previous steps that have
been taken.
Three Types of Measures for Computer Security
Incident Response

Figure 2. Three Measurement Types for Incident Response

Three types of measures that exist for evaluating IR

include cost, time, and quality (See Figure 2. Three
Measurement Types for Incident Response, Above)
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(Wheatman,

Personal Communication, August 2010). These three measures

provide a holistic approach towards evaluating efficiency,
effectiveness, and implementation in an IR program. When

evaluating incident reports, these three measures can
overlap by comprising a mixture of two or three measures.
For example, when using the metrics framework to evaluate

compliance for timeframe reporting the result may require

management to consider implementing changes that impact
the cost of the IR program. The cost benefit analysis for

decreasing reporting time to meet timeframe requirements
is a measurement of quality. This involves all three

measurement types to address compliance. Depending on the
purpose for measuring IR, these three measurement types
will be the foundation to evaluate and measure a CSIR
program.

Figure 3. Cost Types for Incident Response
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Cost in CSIR is determined based on three areas:

1) the cost to maintain IR capabilities, 2) the cost to
remediate an incident, and 3) the cost to implement change
in an IR program (Rezmierski, Deering, Fazio, & Ziobro,
1998; Torner, Personal Communication, February 2011)

(See

Figure 3. Cost Types for Incident Response, Above). Please
note that cost for this metrics framework deals only with

financial cost. There are existing formulas (See Appendix
B) that aid in evaluating IR and offer standardized
expressions to make IR evaluations more consistent. When

evaluating costs for IR, the more entities that are
identified and assigned costs, the more accurate the cost
measurement will be. For tangible items, cost is easier to
assign. But for intangibles such as reputation and trust

it becomes much harder to assign a dollar amount. The
criteria for evaluating cost for IR requires

identification of the three cost areas and the ability to
continually assign related costs as new costs are
identified.
The cost to maintain CSIR capabilities and services

include direct and indirect costs that can be attributed
to CSIR operational costs. From an accounting perspective
the cost of direct labor, direct material, and applied

overhead costs should be considered (Brewer, Garrison, &
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Noreen, 2009). Activity based costing method for

calculation is suggested. However, the trade-off to more

accurately assigned activity costs is the time and money

needed to discover the cost of each activity. The best way

to determine cost to maintain CSIR is to evaluate ones
need to measure and how much one is willing to pay in

order to obtain accurate cost estimates.
The cost to remediate varies depending upon the

incident and the methods chosen to remediate. But for this
metrics framework it is important to find common incidents
that have relatively similar financial costs. Although

costs will vary, it is crucial that all methods of
remediation attribute a financial cost when applicable. As
noted before, intangibles like trust and reputation do not

always have an associated financial cost. Therefore, it is
important to look at costs for either costs savings or
improvement in remediation efforts.

Implementation costs are financial costs attributed

from the impact of making change to CSIR capabilities. The
cost to implement change is reliant on both the cost to

maintain services and the cost to remediate. A cost
benefit analysis approach is recommended for determining

implementation costs (Xie & Mead, 2004) . The importance of
implementation costs are determining whether or not making
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change is worth the financial costs, given the desired
outcome and the likelihood it would occur.
The importance of measuring time for CSIR is the

duration between activities and the total time it takes to
resolve an incident. This deals with points of time and

the lengths of time in between points. In particular there
can be two or more points that exist within a CSIR event.

The three points of time for an incident include: 1) Start

Time, 2) the Time-in-Between, and 3) the Finish Time (See

Figure 4. Time Measurement Points for Incident Response,
Below).

1
Start Time

2
Time Between Nodes

3
Finish Time

Figure 4. Time Measurement Points for Incident Response

Start Time usually is the time the incident is

reported. It is the first recorded and realized moment

that an incident has occurred. This statement for start
time is probably the most important aspect of measuring

time for CSIR because of the discrepancies that exist

within a FISMA or IG audits. As shown in Chapter One, the
timeframe reporting requirements US-CERT states broad to
strict reporting times depending on the different incident
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categories. Therefore, it only makes sense that the time
to report only starts when an incident is reported and is
realized, meaning the first time it is reported at the

level being considered.
Time-in-Between deals with the many nodes an incident
goes through as it is resolved by one or many entities.
The finish time can either be the time the incident is

reported as resolved or the time the incident report is

closed out. The structure for measuring time depends on

how an agency keeps its timestamps and what aspect of time
it is trying to evaluate. Time in the sense of IR is all

about how long. Determining how long offers the ability to
gauge performance. It allows agencies to determine if

changes are needed and how changes can affect time.
Quality is self-determined that can be subjective or

objective or both depending on the measurement conditions
(Scarfone, Grance, & Masone, 2008, p. 3-25) . An
organization is able to interpret the results of an IR

measurement and gauge whether the results are good or bad.
Statistics such as counts for incidents initiated,
unresolved, or resolved are interpreted based on the

priority and values of the organization. A high number of
reported incidents may be seen as a good thing because it
shows that people are reporting incidents as they occur.
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However it could also mean the agency's security controls
are not doing their job. Or, adversely, a low incident

count could reflect that security controls are working and
there are a less number of incidents occurring. However,

this could just as well be the agency not reporting
because of fear of showing that too many incidents are

occurring. Depending on the agency's priorities and goals,
any particular moment can drastically effect the

interpretation of IR results and the value that exists in
that information. Quality is thus self-determined and put
into the interpretation of the agency based on where they

find value in the information.
Objective Driven Measurements

It is important to establish the objective for
maintaining a metric before introducing IR evaluations to
an audience. This allows the audience to relate how

measuring performance of an IR program supports the
organization's mission. As identified in NIST Special

Publication 800-55, security metrics must be driven by

goals and objectives (Chew, Swanson, Stine, Bartol, Brown,
& Robinson, 2008). The audience must understand the
objectives for an IR metric in advance to understand why
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measurement of a CSIR is being conducted (Alberts, Allen,

& Stoddard, 2011).
This component of the metrics framework is essential

in the determination, selection, and presentation for
measuring CSIR capabilities. Determining objective(s) is
the first step before selecting security measurements for

a CSIR program. A crucial part of determining objectives
for security measurements is to evaluate organizational

needs and the mission of the organization.

By deriving security measurements from objectives and
goals, the results from the metric can be meaningful.

Objective driven metrics enable the entity that is
conducting the measurement to bring value to the
organization using the results from the metric evaluation.

Clearly stating the objective and goal of the measurement

before selecting what to measure offers guidance into what
should be measured and explains to the audience why it is

being measured in the first place. Therefore, objective

driven measurements are essential to the success of

conducting security metrics for a CSIR program and gives
consideration to organizational measurement concerns.
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Audience Based Measurements

c°s
Administrative View
Operational View

External View
Figure 5. Audience Based Measurements

As shown in Figure 5. Audience Based Measurements
above, there are three identified audience groups for the
intended user of the metrics framework: 1) administrative,

2) operational, and 3) external. Since the intended user

is middle management, the audience meant for the security
measurement of a CSIR involves upper management, CSIRT

staff, and auditors. Each audience groups have their own
specific needs. Although their needs may overlap, their
purpose for viewing the results of a security metric for

CSIR and expectations of the presented information is
quite different.
The administrative level view is based on middle to
executive level management. Stakeholders at the
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administrative level view may include the -Chief
Information Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Chief
Technology Officer, Chief Information Security Officers

(CISOs), Associate CISOs, and Directors of bureau CSIRTs.
These positions within an agency have relatively large

amounts of responsibility for the agency and high level

decision making powers, therefore, this group may only be

interested in high level information and may want
everything synthesized for the purpose of making high

level decisions.
The operational level view includes those who are on

the front lines dealing with the incident. It includes the

technical staff that may want the detailed information to

find problems within the CSIR processes. Stakeholders at
the operational level view includes CSIRT Managers, CSIRT

Analysts, CSIRT Operators, and all other CSIRT personnel
that have direct contact with the CSIR processes at the

bureau level. It is important to understand the role of
stakeholders at the operational level because it offers

insight into the expectation of security metrics and
metric results. Stakeholders at the operational level may

be interested in the cost and or time to respond to an
incident within the bureau CSIRT.
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The external level view is for auditors, those

outside the CSIR program that need an assessment into

measuring CSIR performance. Stakeholders at the external
level view include FISMA auditors by DHS, IG auditors, and
all other entities looking at the performance measure of -

CSIR capabilities from outside the agency. This may

include the IG of an agency which would technically be
inside the agency, but because of their role they are
considered at the external level view. The importance of

grouping this type of audience into the external level
view is because their needs are specific to check for

compliance against some specific standard, regulation, or
mandate.
Understanding that the audience does matter and

giving them consideration for the selection of security
metrics for CSIR is important to the success of conducting

any security metric. This is a critical aspect of the
metrics framework because it offers the ability to
identify measurements based on audience needs. Therefore,
all of these views are important for selecting security

metrics for CSIR and tailoring relevant IR metric results

to the intended audience.
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Tying Measurements to the Agency's Mission
Tying security measurements and its results to the
agency's mission is a crucial segment for the metrics
framework. This makes sure that measuring CSIR is not just
for the sake of measurements. The reason CSIR exists is to

benefit the agency's mission. This could mean passing an
audit so the organization is able to continue its normal

operations or responding to a reported incident that saves
the agency time and money. Therefore, the importance of

measuring CSIR is to prove that it supports and enables
the agency to accomplish its mission. By describing in
words how the measurement ties into the agency's mission,

we can demonstrate the value within the CSIR program.
In order to tie the security measurement to the
agency's mission, the purpose and objective needs to drive
the actual security metric from the beginning. If done

properly, the objective and purpose that drives the
security measurement for CSIR will be restated and will
serve as the bridge to demonstrate how the CSIR program
supports the agency's mission. An example of this could

result in stating that the measurement is part of a series
of measurements that is helping the organization prepare
for an audit. Any objective can be stated as long as it
supports the agency's mission. But it is still important
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to make the tie on how the CSIR metric results support the

mission so that the agency as a whole can understand the

value behind CSIR capabilities.
Process Flow Identification
Process flow identification involves identifying the

processes within CSIR capabilities. For a bureau, the
process flow starts from the incident being
reported/detected, to triaging, to remediating, to
sustaining, and at some point reporting to the agency

headquarters CSIRT. For an agency it is similar, except
the agency reports to US-CERT. Depending on the makeup of

the organization the process for notification and

remediation will vary. Please see Figure 6. Bureau Level
Process Flow and Figure 7. Agency Level Process Flow below
for an illustration of Bureau Level and Agency

Headquarters Level process flows for incident reporting.

As shown in Figure 6. Bureau Level Process Flow and
Figure 7. Agency Level Process Flow below, the figures
illustrate the processes and functions within a CSIR

capability. They show the methods of communication such as
phone, email, and web portal. The importance to note is
that at the federal government level, depending on the

CSIRTs position within an agency their process and makeup
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will vary. Notably the accuracy and greater capabilities

in a CSIR program will depend on the maturity level of the
CSIRTs.
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Figure 6. Bureau Level Process Flow
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Figure 7. Agency Level Process Flow

In order to identify the process flow for CSIR
capabilities it is important to identify information

assets and stakeholders within a CSIRT. Aside from looking

at an inventory list it is best to look at policies and

guides produced by CSIRTs. Usually the policies will
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outline current capabilities and processes with a bureau's

CSIRT. However, not all organizations follow their
existing policies and guides. It is therefore best to

verify known process flows. A great way to determine
process flows is through discussion with CSIRTs and

directors of CSIRTs. This can serve to be invaluable in

identifying process flows for CSIR capabilities.
Over time the amount of known processes and entities
involved with CSIR capabilities will accumulate. With more

accurate information process flow, identification can help
determine the cost and time allotted to each entity within

CSIR capabilities. Therefore, process flow identification
is crucial to security metrics and offers an illustrated

approach towards understanding an organization's CSIR
capabilities.

Measurement Form for Computer
Security Incident Response
The Incident Response Measurement Form I've created
draws from NIST Special Publication 800-55 Measure 10 and
CIS Security Metrics vl.1.0 (See Figure 8. Incident

Response Measurement Fort Part 1, Below). The names and

definitions for each section differ from existing
documentation so please be sure to read the descriptions

below.
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Incident Response Measurement Form

Date: 2011 April, 05 ■ Tuesday

Author: Name

MetricID

Incident Response Metric Name

Purpose & Objective

Description

Measure Type

Check all that apply:
□ cost

□

□ Time

Quality

Formula

Description

Measurement/Formula Description

Data Source(s)

Responsible Parties

Audience
Check all that apply:

Frequency

□ Administrative
□ Operational
□ External
□ Other:
□ Annual □Monthly

□ Weekly

□Dally

□Other:

Tie to Agency Mission

Comments:

All Copyrights Reserved © 2011 Vincent Sritapan

Figure 8. Incident Response Measurement Form Part 1

"Metric ID" is a number and/or letter that is
assigned by the person conducting the measurement.

Following the Metric ID is the metric name, also given by
the person conducting the measure.
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"Purpose & Objective" is the section where the

purpose and objective of the measurement is stated. This
is stated before the actual measurement formula and is
essential to creating a meaningful measurement.

"Measurement Type" is a section with three check
boxes that allows the user of the form to choose which of
the three types of measures are being conducted. Please

note that the measurement can involve one to as many as

three measurement types in the measurement form.
"Formula" is the section where the formula for the

measurement can be outlined and detailed. This is a

critical part of the measurement because it enables for
others to understand how the measurement is being

conducted. Using formulas enables others to repeat the
measurement and use it for their own measurement purposes.
"Description" is the section that clarifies the
meaning of the formula. If there are any exceptions,

notations, etc. the author of the form can explain the
formula in detail.
"Data Source(s)" is the section where assets

containing or controlling sources of data for the
measurement are identified. Depending on the agency this
can involve one or many sources of data.
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"Responsible Parties" is the section that identifies
who is responsible for conducting and overseeing the

measurement. This could involve technicians, analysts,
and/or upper management.
"Audience" is a section that identifies the intended
audience. This may comprise of one or multiple viewing

audiences depending on the situation.

"Frequency" is the mode of measurement. It is a
selection for periods of time for when the measurement is

to be conducted or what points of time they wish to
review.

"Tie to Agency Mission" is a section that tries to
put into words how the measurement ties into the agency's
mission.
"Comments" is a free section for the author/user to
use this form and place any notes or comments necessary

for the measurement. The Comment section is a space that

is utilized at the user's discretion.
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Revision History
Date

Name

Notes

All Copyrights Reserved □ 2011 Vincent Sritapan

Figure 9. Incident Response Measurement Form Part 2

Another aspect for the measurement form is the
revision control history form that is attached to each
metric (See Figure 9. Incident Response Measurement Form

Part 2, Above). The above form is intended for CSIRTs and
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CSIR stakeholders to reuse the metric ID and formula.
Aside from creating a practical and clear guide for
security metrics regarding CSIR, this project also looks

to promote collaborations supporting the archiving of
security metrics.
Summary

Metrics Framework for Incident Response

Cost

Time

Quality

Admir iistrative Lev el View
Open ationai Leva 1 View

Exl emal Level' Hew

Continuous Improvement in Incident Response

Organization’s Mission

Figure 10. The Metrics Framework for Incident Response

As shown in Figure 10. The Metrics Framework for
Incident Response, the metrics framework for CSIR includes
three types of measurements for CSIR, cost, time, and

quality. It identifies the need for objective driven
measurements, the need to consider audience groups for
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measurement evaluations and presenting results, the need

to tying measurements to the agency's mission, and the
importance of process flow identification. The metrics
framework for CSIR is also accompanied by a measurement

form for CSIR. The measurement form is specifically geared
towards utilizing the framework and creating CSIR security

metrics. Overall, the metrics framework for CSIR is a
product of the education, work experience, and literature
research conducted in search for a common platform for

measuring CSIR capabilities.
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CHAPTER FIVE

APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK
Introduction
Chapter Five provides a fictitious scenario that uses
the metrics framework for CSIR including the measurement

form. The case scenario tries to illustrate usage of the

different types of measurements that exists for this

framework.

Case Scenario
In this scenario, an agency containing 10 bureaus is
making preparations at the headquarter level for a FISMA

audit under the program of incident management. One of the
anticipated questions is the compliance for timeframe

reporting. The samples of incidents for the 10 bureaus,

Bureaus A through J, are shown in Table 1. Sample Incident

Reports. For simplification only category 1, unauthorized
access, 2, denial of service, and 3, malicious code,
incidents were used in this case (See Appendix A United

States Computer Emergency Readiness Team Reporting
Criteria for incident categories). Note that federal

agency must adhere to US-CERT timeframe reporting
requirements (US-CERT, 2011).
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The case scenario is an audit preparation that
involves security measurements for timeframe reporting and

it illustrate the use of the metrics framework for CSIR.

Please refer to Appendix A for federal agency incident
criteria and timeframe reporting requirements.
Before providing the sample data, it is important to
understand that each CSIRT will have their own incident
reports for measuring depending on their agency's CSIR

capabilities. Some agencies may have more or less data
points to measure depending on the maturity of their CSIR

program. Also, as noted in the assumptions in Chapter One,
the agency must have CSIR capabilities and must collect

data points for measuring CSIR capabilities. The data
points can usually be found at the CSIR Center or with the

CSIRT. CSIRTs should have the necessary data specific to
measuring timeframe reporting.

Before looking at the sample data Figure 10. Columns
and Names for Sample Incident Reports describe each column

respective to their column title. The format of the data
for each column is shown in Figure 10. Columns and Names
for Sample Incident Reports and described in the following

paragraph.
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Ticket
No.

Bureau Category Subject Occurred

Reported

Created

Submit US-CERT

Type

Ph

Status

Yes/

Open/

No

Closed

Cyber/
letter

0-6

Text

YYYY.MM.D YYYY.MM.DD YYYY.MM.DD.H YYYY.MNWD.HH. Equipment/
MM^S
Physical
H.MM.SS
D.HH.MM.SS HH.MM.SS

Figure 11. Columns and Names for Sample Incident Reports

As shown in Figure 11. Columns and Names for Sample

Incident Reports, "Ticket No." refers to the assigned
number when an incident is reported to the agency

headquarters level. "Bureau" letter is the bureau letter,
similar to a bureau name that would represent the bureau.
"Category" is the incident type as defined by US-CERT and

NIST Special Publication 800-61. Notably, an incident can

have more than one assigned category. "Subject" text is
the subject name for the incident, which can also include

a limited text description. "Occurred" is the estimated

time of an incident occurrence. This can sometimes be

exact if the data capture is electronic, but it is

normally a perceived time that an individual determines.
"Reported" is the time an incident is first reported at

the bureau level. "Created" displays the time the incident

is reported/submitted from the bureau CSIRT to the agency
headquarter CSIRT. "Submit US-CERT" displays the time the

incident is submitted from the agency headquarters CSIRT
to US-CERT. Please note that the time is constructed with
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I

the year, month, day, hour, minute, and second. "Type" is

the type of incident in regards to a physical paper

incident, equipment incident, or cyber incident. "PII" is
the column that identifies if the incident involves
personally identifiable information (PII). "Status" is in

regards to whether an incident ticket no. is still open or
if it has been closed.

Sample Data

According to the scenario, the sample incident reports
came from the CSIRT at the agency headquarters level. The

information from the sample incident reports is being used

to measure performance on CSIR timeframe reporting. This is

in preparation for the upcoming FISMA audit. The data set
for this scenario can be found in Table 1. Sample Incident

Reports below.
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Table 1. Sample Incident Reports
Ticket No./ Category/
Subject Occurred
Bureau

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
A
B
B
C
D
D
E
F
F
G
H
H
I
J
J

1
2
1
1
3
1
3
1
1
1
2
3
1
3
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
3
1

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Reported

Created

Submit US-CERT

2011.01.01.14.00.00 2011.01.01.14.45.112011.01.01.15.05.15 2011.01.01.15.15.16
2011.01.01.16.30.00 2011.01.02.08.45.45 2011.01.02.10.15.23 2011.01.02.10.25.24
2011.01.01.18.00.00 2011.01.02.10.28.13 2011.01.02.11.08.14 2011.01.02.11.18.15
2011.01.02.08.15.00 2011.01.03.11.40.26 2011.01.03.11.55.27 2011.01.03.12.05.28
2011.01.02.14.00.00 2011.01.03.14.45.27 2011.01.03.19.45.28 2011.01.03.19.54.29
2011.01.03.12.00.00 2011.01.04.04.40.28 2011.01.04.05.33.29 2011.01.04.05.42.30
2011.01.05.04.45.00 2011.01.06.08.10.29 2011.01.06.16.10.30 2011.01.06.16.19.31
2011.01.06.11.00.00 2011.01.08.14.22.30 2011.01.08.14.52.112011.01.08.15.01.12
2011.01.06.14.30.00 2011.01.09.20.16.312011.01.10.20.16.32 2011.01.10.21.24.33
2011.01.11.14.00.00 2011.01.12.14.12.12 2011.01.12.14.12.12 2011.01.12.14.20.13
2011.01.11.16.45.00 2011.01.18.07.40.312011.01.18.08.30.22 2011.01.18.08.38.23
2011.02.01.11.15.00 2011.02.12.05.45.55 2011.02.14.11.45.56 2011.02.14.11.53.57
2011.02.07.08.15.00 2011.02.13.07.38.25 2011.02.13.08.28.00 2011.02.13.08.36.01
2011.02.17.19.30.00 2011.02.19.17.20.36 2011.02.20.11.20.37 2011.02.20.11.30.38
2011.02.11.07.00.00 2011.02.23.19.22.22 2011.02.23.20.12.23 2011.02.23.20.21.24
2011.02.21.12.00.00 2011.02.24.14.40.38 2011.02.24.20.20.19 2011.02.24.20.29.20
2011.01.07.19.30.00 2011.02.24.18.49.26 2011.02.24.18.59.112011.02.24.19.08.12
2011.01.16.18.15.00 2011.02.27.23.40.40 2011.02.28.08.05.412011.02.28.08.14.42
2011.03.01.05.45.00 2011.03.02.21.28.19 2011.03.03.11.28.20 2011.03.03.11.38.21
2011.01.21.04.45.00 2011.03.07.15.41.42 2011.03.07.16.11.43 2011.03.07.16.19.44
2011.02.11.14.00.00 2011.03.10.19.10.33 2011.03.11.09.11.22 2011.03.11.09.20.23
2011.01.09.22.15.00 2011.03.12.16.09.44 2011.03.12.17.09.45 2011.03.12.17.19.46
2011.03.01.21.30.00 2011.03.15.19.33.52 2011.03.16.08.55.53 2011.03.16.10.03.54
2011.02.11.09.45.00 2011.03.18.23.30.412011.03.18.23.30.412011.03.18.23.39.42
2011.03.01.22.15.00 2011.03.19.09.43.37 2011.03.19.09.43.37 2011.03.19.09.52.38

'Type PIT Status
Cyber
Cyber
Phys
Cyber
Equip
Phys
Cyber
Cyber
Equip
Phys
Cyber
Phys
Equip
cyber
Phys
Cyber
Qber
Phys
Phys
Qber
cyber
cyber
Equip
Cyber
Phys

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
NO
Yes
No
Yes
NO
Yes
No
NO
Yes
No
Nd
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Nd
Nd
Yes
Nd
Yes

Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Cpen
Closed
Closed
Closed.
Open
Closed
Closed
Closed
Open
Closed
Closed.
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Open
Closed.
Closed

Metric Development
For the analysis of this case scenario, Metric ID

001, 002, and 003 were created (See Figure 12. Measurement

Form for Metric ID 001, Figure 13. Measurement Form for
Metric ID 002, Figure 14. Measurement Form for Metric ID
003, below). Metric ID 001 looks at the number of

incidents for the agency based on incident categories 0

through 6. Metric ID 002 looks at the duration for each

incident against the time required to report. Metric ID
003 looks at the percentage of incidents reported on time.
The analysis identifies the current status of the CSIR

capabilities as well as usage of the metrics framework.

Step by Step Application
Using the metrics framework, the measurement form is
applied for each metric developed. First, the objective
and purpose is clearly stated. Second, the type of

measurement is identified. Third, the formula and
description is detailed. Fourth, the data sources and

responsible parties are identified. Fifth, the audience
group is selected. Sixth, the frequency of the sample or

measurement is determined. Seventh, the statement for
tying the measurement to the organization's mission is

stated. Eighth, the comments are filled in. Then, after
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the first metric is developed, more metrics may be

developed if needed. Finally, the measurement is conducted
and the results are analyzed. Depending on the findings,

action may be taken to improve CSIR capabilities. In the

case scenario each metric developed will be described,
following this step by step application. The decisions to
be made will be identified and resolution will be stated.
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Incident Response Measurement Form

Date: 2011 April, 05 - Tuesday

Author: Vi nee nt Sritapan
Metric ID001

Number of Incidents for Category 0 - 6

Purpose & Objective

Prepare for FISM A Audit
Determine number of Incidents

Measure Type

Check ah that apply:
□ Cost

□Time

E3 Quality

Formula
Incident Count by Category = Count (Category# Incidents)
Total lncidentsforAgency=£ Count(CategorvO-6 Incidents)

Description

Incident count by category is the number incidents separated by category type.
Total Incidents for Agency includes all reported incidents for the Agencyfor a
defined period of time.

Data Source(s)

Agency CSIRC
Bureau CSIRTs (A through J)

Responsible Parties

Agencyl Head quarters. Di vision 1
Program Manager: Name
ABC Con tract Analyst Group: Senior Analyst, Junior Analyst

Audience

Check all that apply:

E Administrative
□ Operational
□ External

Frequency

□ Annual

Tie to Agency Mission

He Ips organization understand the volume of Incidents being reported
intended for FISMA Audit by DHS.

□ Other
□Monthlv

DWeeklv

□ Dailv

bother FISMA YEAR

Comments:

Step 1; Determine whatincidents are being reported.
Metric ID 001,002,003,004 All grouped for FISMA Audit in Incident Management
All Copyrights Reserved © 2011 Vincent Sritapan

Figure 12. Measurement Form for Metric ID 001

Metric ID 001 is shown in the Figure 11. Measurement

Form for Metric ID 001 above and is a quality measurement
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type that documents at incident counts by category and
total incidents for the agency. The purpose and objective

for the measurement is to prepare for the upcoming FISMA
audit and determine the number of incidents that have

occurred for the agency. The data source is the agency
CSIR center (CSIRC) as well as the bureau CSIRT. The

responsible parties include the agency program manager and
the contracting team. The frequency is selected as "other"

to include the FISMA year. This scenario is defined as
January 1st, 2011 through May 1st, 2011. This metric is
tied to the agency's mission since it helps determine the
volume of incidents reported that are relevant for the
FISMA audit. The comments section shows that this metric

is the first step for preparing for the upcoming FISMA
audit and that metric ID 002, 003, and 004 are all

related.
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Incident Response Measurement Form

Date: 2011 April, 05 - Tuesday
Author: Vincent Sritapan

MetriclD002

Duration for Category 0-6 Incidents

Purpose & Objective

Preparations for F(SM A Audits
Determine if Age n cy 1 Is c omp 11 ant for reporting incidents

Measure Type

CheckaH that apply:
□ Cost

□

0Time

Quality

Formula

Duration {Time Created to Time Submitted to US-CERT) less Time Required

Description

Time Created is the first official notification time to Agency HQ
Time Submitted to US-CERT is the end time for required timeframe reporting
Time Required depends on Category 0-6 (Please see US-CERT.gov)

Data Source(s)

Agency CSIRC
Bureau CSIRTs(A through J)

Responsible Parties

Agencyl Headquarters, Division 1
Program Manager: Name
ABC Contract Analyst Group: Senior Analyst, Junior Analyst

Audience

0
□
0
□
□

Checked] thatupply:

Frequency

Tie to Agency Mission

Administrative
Operational
External
Other:
Annual □ Monthly

ElWeeklv

□ Dai hr

0 Other: FISM A YEAR

Helps organization meettimeframe reportingcompliance.
Intended for FfSMA Audit by DHS.

Comments:
Step 2: Determine Duration of Incident Re ports
Metric iD001,002,003,004All grouped for FJSMA Auditin Incident Management

All Copyrights Reserved © 2011 Vincent Sritapan

Figure 13. Measurement Form for Metric ID 002

Metric ID 002 is shown in Figure 13. Measurement Form
for Metric ID 002 above is a time measurement type that
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determines the duration of an incident and the time
required to report. The purpose and objective for the

measurement is to prepare for the coming FISMA audit and
determine that the agency is compliant in its timeframe

reporting. The data source is the agency CSIR center
(CSIRC) as well as the bureau CSIRT. The responsible

parties include the agency program manager and contracting
team. The frequency is selected as "other" to include the

FISMA year. This metric is tied to the agency's mission
because it helps determine if the agency is meeting the
timeframe reporting requirements. The comments section
shows that this metric is the second step for preparing
for the upcoming FISMA audit and that metric ID 002, 003,

and 004 are all related.
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Incident Response Measurement Form

Date: 2011 April, 05 - Tuesday
Author: VincentSritapan

MetriclDOOS

Percentage of Incidents Reported on Time

Purpose SObjective

Pre pa ratio ns for FISMA Audits
Determine if Agency 1 is compliant for reporting incidents

Measure Type

Cheek all that apply:
□ Cost

ETime

S Quality

Formula

iooflncidentsReoortedonTime = Number of Incident Re porte don Time
Total Number of Incidents Reported
Description

Percentage of incidents reported on time is determined by the category type.
(Please see US-CERT.gov)

Data Source(s)

Agency CSIRC
Bureau CSIRTs (A through J)

Responsible Parties

Agency 1 Headquarters, Division 1
Program Manager: Name
A8C Contract Analyst Group: Senior Analyst, Junior Analyst

Audience

0
□
0
□
□

Check all tha t apply:

Frequency

Tie to Agency Mission

Administrative
Operational
External
Other
Annual □ Monthly

□ Weeklv

□ Daily

0 Other: FISMA YEAR

Helps organization meettimeframe reporting compliance,
intended for FISMA Audit by DHS.

Comments:
Step 3: Determine Compliance percentage
Note: Manage mentwants95%and above on time reporting.
'‘ All Incidents notreportedon time must have documentation.
Metric 10001,002,003,004AII grouped for FISMA Audit in Incident Management

All Copyrights Reserved © 2011 Vincent Sritapan

Figure 14. Measurement Form for Metric ID 003

Metric ID 003 is shown in Figure 14. Measurement Form
for Metric ID 003 above and is a time and quality

measurement type that determines the percentage of
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incidents reported on time. The purpose and objective for
the measurement is to prepare for the upcoming FISMA audit

and determine if the agency is compliant in its timeframe

reporting. The data source is the agency CSIR center
(CSIRC) as well as the bureau CSIRT. The responsible

parties include the agency program manager and contracting

team. The frequency is selected as other to include the
FISMA year. This metric is tied to the agency's mission

because it helps determine if the agency is meeting their
timeframe reporting requirements. The comments section

shows that this metric is the third step for preparing for
the upcoming FISMA audit and that management requires 95%

compliance for incidents reported on time.

Scope of Analysis
The analysis shows that there are 25 incidents

reported for the agency. For this case scenario the agency
headquarters CSIRT was asked to prepare for the FISMA
audit based on compliance for timeframe reporting. The

only points of time that are of interest to the audit are
the "Created" and "Submit US-CERT" times. At the agency

headquarters level the time to report begins once the
incident is reported. Using the given data set the
"Created" is the time reported at the agency headquarters
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CSIRT level. With the given information all incidents
regarding PII are required to be reported in one hour of

notification. The scope of the analysis and its results

are taken from the agency headquarters point of view.

Results

14

2

3

Category

Figure 15. Incident Count by Category

For Metric ID 001 we find that there are a total of
25 incidents reported within the current FISMA year. Of

those 25 incidents reported there are 13 category 1

incidents, 7 category 2 incidents, and 5 category 3

incidents (See Figure 15. Incident Count by Category,
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Above). Additionally, we can illustrate the results by
bureau letter in Figure 16. Incident Count by Category and
Bureau below.

Category and Bureau

For Metric ID 002 we can see that the average time it
takes for an incident to be reported from the agency
headquarters CSIRT to US-CERT is about 9 minutes with the
exception of 2 outliers. The outliers are Ticket No. 10

and 23 involving bureau I and PII for the incidents.
Therefore, with the requirement being under one hour, 23
of the 25 incidents have been reported on time.
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Table 2. Duration for Sample Incident Reports
Within 1

Ticket Mb./

Bureau
1
A
2
B
C
3
4
5

D
E

6
7

F

8
9

10
11
12
13

G
H
I

J
A
B

B

14

C

15

D
D
E

16
17
18

19

F

Cat.
1

Created
Submit US-CERT
2011.01.01.15.05.15 2011.01.01.15.15.16

Duration.
10 min

hour
Yes

2

2011.01.02.10.15.23 2011.01.02.10.25.24

10 min

Yes

1
1

2011.01.02.11.08.14

2011.01.02.11.18.15
2011.01.03.12.05.28

10 min
10 min

Yes

3

2011.01.03.19.45.28 2011.01.03.19.54.29
2011.01.04.05.33.29 2011.01.04.05.42.30

9 min

Yes

9 mill
9 min
9 min
1 liour 8 min
8 min

Yes
Yes

8 min
8 min

Yes
Yes

2011.02.13.08.28.00 2011.02.13.08.36.01

8 min.

Yes

3
2

2011.02.20.11.20.37 2011.02.20.11.30.38
2011.02.23.20.12.23 2011.02.23.20.21.24

10 min

Yes

1
1
2

2011.02.24.20.20.19 2011.02.24.20.29.20
2011.02.24.18.59.11 2011.02.24.19.08.12
2011.02.28.08.05.41 2011.02.28.08.14.42
2011.03.03.11.28.20 2011.03.03.11.38.21

9 min
9 min
9 min
9 min.
10 min

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

8 mill
9 min
10 min

Yes
Yes
Yes

1 hour 8 min
9 min
9 min

No
Yes

1
3
1
1
1
2

3
1

2

2011.01.03.11.55.27

2011.01.06.16.10.30 2011.01.06.16.19.31
2011.01.08.14.52.11 2011.01.08.15.01.12
2011.01.10.20.16.32 2011.01.10.21.24.33
2011.01.12.14.12.12

2011.01.12.14.20.13
2011.01.18.08.30.22 2011.01.18.08.38.23
2011.02.14.11.45.56 2011.02.14.11.53.57

20
21
22

F
G
H
H

1
2
2

23
24

I
J

1
3

2011.03.07.16.11.43 2011.03.07.16.19.44
2011.03.11.09.11.22 2011.03.11.09.20.23
2011.03.12.17.09.45 2011.03.12.17.19.46
2011.03.16.08.55.53 2011.03.16.10.03.54
2011.03.18.23.30.41 2011.03.18.23.39.42

25

J

1

2011.03.19.09.43.37 2011.03.19.09.52.38

Yes

Yes
NO

Yes

Yes

The average time to report to US-CERT from the agency

headquarters level is 9 minutes, with the exception of two
incidents (See Table 2. Duration for Sample Incident

Reports, Above). This means 23 out of the 25 incidents
have been reported on time. According the Metric ID 003
the percentage of incidents reported on time is 92% (See
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Figure 17. Percentage of Incidents Reporting on Time,

Below). As noted in the comments section for Metric ID

003, management requires 95% compliance for on time
incident reporting. With this result, careful
consideration is needed to determine the root cause of the

problem and possible actions may need to be taken to
ensure on time reporting.

Figure 17. Percentage of Incidents Reporting On Time
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Root Cause

j

i

i

|______ List of Root Causes_______ ;
I_____ Policies not defined____ _
l Improperbusiness process design {
Improper network architecture
j Improper network configuration ;
i _
Lack of training________ \
j
Incomplete audits_______
i
Insufficient resources_____ '
I
Policies not enforced
;
(Allen, & Davis, 2010)_________________________
Figure 18. List of Root Causes by Computer Emergency

Response Team Coordination Center

With further analysis from the case scenario the root
cause has been identified. A list of known root causes can

be found in Figure 18. List of Root Causes by Computer
Emergency Response Team Coordination Center above. By

looking at the data set, the bureau where the incident

originated from is bureau I. With further investigation
the root cause is determined to be the lack of information
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provided, from the incident reported by bureau I. This
causes the submission from the agency to US-CERT to be

delayed. The policy at the agency level does not clearly
outline the minimum requirement to submit via incident

category 0-6. Additionally, the policy does not properly
utilize category 6 for incidents that are still under
investigation.

Decision to Be Made By Management
For this scenario management must decide whether to

report incidents to US-CERT even when lacking information

or require the bureaus to use category 6 for incidents
that are lacking information. The cost measurement is

shown in Figure 19. Measurement Form for Metric ID 004
below. Metric ID 004 measures the cost to change policy at
the agency level, including the cost to notify and train

bureau CSIRTs on using category 6 type incidents.
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Incident Response Measurement Form

Date: 2 011 April, 05 - Tuesday

Author: Vincent Sritapan
Metric ID 004

Cost to Change Reporting Procedure

Purpose & Objective

Improve Incident Reporting Process
Measure Cost BenefitforChangingReporting Procedures

Measure Type

Check al! that apply:
E Cost

□ Quality

□Time

Formula

Cost of Policy Change = Rate(laborHours for Revision & Notification)
Materials for Notification

Description

Labor rate may vary for revision and notification
Materials for notification include training costs to update Bureau CSIRTs

Data SoLirce(s)

Agency CSIRC
Bureau CSIRTs (A through J)

Responsible Parties

Agency ! Headquarters, Division 1
Program Manager: Name
ABC Contract Analyst Group: Senior Analyst, Junior Analyst

Audience

E
E
□
□
□

Check all that apply:

Frequency

Tie to Agency Mission

Administrative
Operational
External
Other:
Annual □ Monthly

□ Weekly

□ Daily

E Other: FISMA YEAR.

Helps organization meet timeframe reportingcompliance.
Intended for FISMA Audit by OHS.

Comments:

Determine Cost Change Reporting Procedures
Metric 10 001,002,003,004All grouped for FISMA Audit In Incident Management.

All Copyrights Reserved © 2011 Vincent Srttapan

Figure 19. Measurement Form for Metric ID 004

For simplification, the results of Metric ID 004 find
that it costs $10,000 to change the policy and

notify/train CSIRT staff. Management finds that clearly
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defining use of category 6 solves the issue of on time
reporting.

Summary
The case scenario was a basic illustration that used
the metrics framework to support improvement in CSIR

capabilities. For each measurement form developed, the

metric ID always started by stating a purpose or
objective, illustrating the driving force for the

measurement. The measurement form was used to prepare for
upcoming FISMA and IG audits, particular to incident
management. The security measurement for CSIR ties into
the agency's mission as it enables them to pass audit

requirements and continue services that are mission

critical. The metrics framework provided was a simplistic
framework that identifies the necessary components needed

to conduct a security measurement for CSIR.

70

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction
Chapter Six provides the conclusions and
recommendations as a result of this project. It reinforces

the purpose of the metrics framework and the need for CSIR

metrics within the federal government.
Conclusions

The conclusions drawn from the metrics framework for

CSIR are as follows:
1.

There are three types of measurements for

measuring CSIR.
2.

Measurements must be driven by objectives and

goals.
3.

Consideration of the audience needs to identify
CSIRT metrics and results are critical for

satisfying the audience.

4.

Tying measurements to the agency's mission is

essential to the success of the security
measurement, enabling the user to show the value
within a CSIR program.
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Recommendations
The recommendations as a result of the metrics
framework for CSIR are as follows:

1.

Use the metrics framework and accompanying

measurement form to measure CSIR performance.
2.

Save security metric formulas and notes for

CSIR.

3.

Collaborate and share security metric

developments with others to save time and money.
4.

Routinely measure CSIR capabilities for

continuous improvement and to illustrate its
value in supporting the agency's mission.
Summary
Chapter Six reviews the drawn conclusions and the

derived recommendations for this developed metrics
framework. The overall metrics framework for CSIR is an

effort to provide a standard model that supports security

metric evaluations for CSIR. I sincerely hope in the
future, the public and private sector can come together to

create meaningful security metrics for all. As with this
metrics framework, the hope is to provide a framework

where security measurements provide accountability and

support the agency's mission.
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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM

REPORTING CRITERIA
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Federal Agency Incident Categories
Category
Name
CATO Exercise/Network
Defense Testing

CAT 1

"“Unauthorized
Access

CAT 2

"Denial of Service
(DoS)

CAT 3

"Malicious Code

CAT 4
CATS

■ CATS

Description
This category is used during state, federal,
national,.international exercises and approved,
activity testing of intern a l/external network
defenses or responses.
In this category an individual gains logical or
physical .access without permission to a federal
agency network, system, application, data, or
other resource
An attack that successfully prevents or impairs
tine normal authorized functionality of. networks,
systems or applications by exhausting
resources. This activity, includes being the victim1
or participating in the DoS.

Successful installation of malicious software -

(e.g., virus, worm, Trojan horse, or other
code-based malicious entity) that infects an
operating system or application. Agencies are
NOT required to report malicious logic that has
been successfully quarantined by antivirus (AV)
software.
"Improper Usage A person violates acceptable computing use
policies.
Scans/Probes
This category includes any activity that seeks to
/Attempted Access access or identify a federal agency computer,
open ports, protocols, service, or any
combination for later exploit. This activity does
not directly result in a compromise or dental of
service.
Investigation
Unconfirmed incidents that are potentially
malicious or anomalous activity deemed by the
reporting entity to warrant further review.

Reporting Timeframe
Not Applicable; this category is for
each agency's internal use during
exercises.

Within one (1) hour of
discovery/detection.

Within two (2) hours of
discovery/detection if the
successful attack is still ongoing
and the agency is unable'to
successfully mitigate activity.
Daily
Note: Within one (1) hour of
discovery/detection if widespread
across agency.

Weekly

Monthly
Note: If system is classified,
report within one (1) hour of
discovery.

Not Applicable; this category is for,
each agency's use to categorize a
potential incident that is currently
being investigated.

“Defined by NIST Special Publication 800-61

US-CERT,

US-CERT (2011). Federal Agency Incident Categories.
Retrieved from
http://us-cert.gov/federal/reportingRequirements.html

Department of Homeland Security.
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APPENDIX B
FORMULAS FOR COMPUTER SECURITY INCIDENT RESPONSE

BY CENTER FOR INTERNET SECURITY
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C01 = £(Di rect Loss ! Cost of Business System Downti me + Cost of
Containment! Cost of Recovery! Cost of Restitution)
Cost of Incidents

(Direct _Loss +Cost _ Bu sinks'—Downtime +
Cas7 Recove/’v + Cost-Restitution)
MCOI = Cost — Containment +Count(Incidents
)
Mean Cost of Incidents

MIRC =

Count (Incidents)

Mean Cost of Incident Recovery

'LDPate_of_Discovery - Date_of_Occurrence')
MTTID =

Connt(Incidents)
Mean Time to Incident Discovery

^(Date-Of_Occurence[Incident n ] - Date_of_Occurence [Incident^ ])
MTBSI=

Count(Incidents)
Mean Time between Security incidents

Y,(Date_ of Recovery - Date_of_Occiirrence)
d* ~ddd -

Coimt(Incidents)
Mean Time to Incident Response

Center for Internet Security Community (2010). CIS Security Metrics v.1.1.0.
6-39.

The Center for Internet Security,
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APPENDIX C
ACRONYMS
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ACISO: Associate Chief Information Security Officer
CERT/CC: Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center

CERT: Computer Emergency Response Team

CIO: Chief Information Officer
C1SO: Chief Information Security Officer

CMU: Carnegie Mellon University
CSIR: Computer Security Incident Response
CSIRC: Computer Security Incident Response Center
CSIRT: Computer Security Incident Response Team

DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Project Agency
DHS: Department of Homeland Security
FISMA: Federal Information Security Management Act

FIRST: Forum on Incident Response and Security Teams
ID: Identification

IDS: Intrusion Detection System
1G: Inspector General

IR: Incident Response
NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology
OMB: Office of Management and Budget

PII: Personally Identifiable Information

SEI: Software Engineering Institute
US-CERT: United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team
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